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IN SEARCH OF FAULKNER'S LAW
Richard Weisberg*
By Jay
Watson. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 277.

FORENSIC FICTIONS: THE LAWYER FIGURE IN FAULKNER.

$35.

Jay Watson 1 writes interestingly about the lawyer figure in William
Faulkner. Using the helpful concept of "forensic fictions," or storytelling about the process of legal investigation, analysis, and rhetoric,
his work will appeal to Faulkner schclars, as it constitutes the first
book-length claim for the significance of Faulkner's interest in law.
The book should also appeal to the many lawyers who already delight
in Yoknapatawpha County's homegrown attorneys, litigious citizens,
and horsetrading manners and mores. Watson's contribution to lawand-literature scholarship, as compared with his articulated debt to it,
needs also to be considered. Before addressing this contribution and
engaging his arguments, however, I will first mention two obvious
paths that Watson chose not to follow.
Watson teaches English literature at Ole Miss, but he imparts no
special regional flavor to his understanding of Faulkner's characters.
Watson's approach relies little on biographical elements, although
early in the book he mentions Faulkner's lifelong Oxford friend, lawyer Phil Stone - in whose copies of the Mississippi Reports Faulkner
found ideas for some of his wittiest tales - and although Watson is
fully familiar with such excellent Faulkner biographers as Susan Snell
and Joseph Blottner.2 More disturbingly, perhaps, Watson pays scant
attention to the literary sources of so much of Faulkner's interest in
law - to such regional writers as Mark Twain, to whose Pudd'nhead
Wilson the clever and often hilarious relation of law and literature can
in part be traced. 3 Watson also largely ignores Dickens and Dostoevski, despite Faulkner's clear debt to their legalistic techniques, 4 and
* Walter Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva University. B.A. 1965, Brandeis; M.A. (French Literature) 1967, Ph.D. (Comparative Literature) 1970, Cornell; J.D. 1974, Columbia. - Ed.
1. Assistant Professor of English, University of Mississippi.
2. Pp. 7, 9, 10-11; see JOSEPH BLOTNER, FAULKNER: A BIOGRAPHY (1 vol. ed. 1984); SUSAN SNELL, PHIL STONE OF OXFORD: A VICARIOUS LIFE (1991).
3. See, for example, Arthur Mizener's comparison of Gavin Stevens and Pudd'nhead in Arthur Mizener, The Thin, Intelligent Face of American Fiction, 17 KENYON REV. 507, 518-20
(1955); see also MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON (Grove Press 1955) (1894).
4. Watson also ignores Peter J. Rabinowitz, The Click of the Spring: The Detective Story as
Parallel Structure in Dostoyevsky and Faulkner. 76 Moo. PHILOLOGY 355 (1979), although he
does cite scholarship linking Faulkner's forensics to lesser known and probably less relevant local
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hardly mentions Camus's contemporaneous and arguably more powerful forensics. 5 Balanced against these omissions, however, is Watson's effective use of broader historical materials that emphasize the
South's special place in the relation of law and letters.
Watson's book deals intensively with only two of Faulkner's many
lawyer figures. The focus on Horace Benbow and Gavin Stevens is
natural, as these are the best known and also the most widely found
lawyer figures in Faulkner's fiction. Benbow's weaknesses cost an innocent client his life in Sanctuary; 6 Stevens is far craftier and quickly
takes over as Faulkner's principal lawyer figure, appearing in a host of
stories7 and eventually a Hollywood film -Intruder in the Dust 8 over four decades of Faulkner's productive life. But one will miss, in a
volume committed to this exclusive topic, wider treatment of the significance of such characters 9 as the "little lawyer" Faulkner signals as
important in Light in August, 10 the invading lawyer with "the long
pale nose" 11 who stereotypically infects the courtroom in Sanctuary, 12
and the justice of the peace whose property decision in the Spotted
Horses episode is so essential to lawyers who want to know Faulkner's
view of legal ratiocination. 13 Moreover, other scholars have extensively analyzed Horace Benbow and Gavin Stevens along the lines of
many of Watson's perceptions. 14
Nonetheless, Watson contributes measurably to our understanding
of Faulkner's legal storytelling, and he does so in both his manner and
his method of textual criticism. Watson sets out to display Faulkner's
sense that doing "good" - and not just "well" - in the law particudetective writers. P. 141 n.3. Meanwhile, Dickens is cast off in two passages and a footnote that
reduce that seminal legal storyteller's characters to mere caricatures. Pp. 4, 89 n.13, 226.
5. Watson mentions Camus's appreciation of Faulkner but does not fruitfully set forth the
omnipresent, tangible themes of the legalistic outsider and the law's proclivity to falsify through
investigatory technique in a comparative way. See pp. 175-76.
6. WILLIAM FAULKNER, SANCTUARY (Vintage Books, corr. ed. 1958) (1931).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE TOWN (1957); WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN
THE Dus-r (Chatto & Windus 1957) (1948); WILLIAM FAULKNER, KNIGHT'S GAMBIT: SIX
MYSTERY STORIES (Chatto & Windus 1951) (1949) [hereinafter FAULKNER, KNIGHT'S
GAMBIT].
8. INTRUDER IN THE Dus-r (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1949).
9. Watson mentions most of these other forensic characters in a kind of string citation. Pp.
3-4.
10. See WILLIAM FAULKNER, LIGHT IN AUGUS'r 276 (Vintage Intl. 1990) (1932).
11. FAULKNER, SANCTUARY, supra note 6, at 296.
12. Watson gives short shrift to this "Memphis jew lawyer'' (p. 76), strange indeed in a work
both extensively covering the role oflaw in Sanctuary and also willing to confront themes of antisemitism elsewhere in Faulkner. See pp. 215-16, 257 n.5; see also FAULKNER, SANCTUARY,
supra note 6, at 279-80.
13. See, e.g., Morris Wolff, Faulkner's Knowledge of the Law, 4 MISS. C. L. REv. 245, 248-56
(1984); see also WILLIAM FAULKNER, Spotted Horses (1931), in THE FAULKNER READER 433
(1954).
14. See, e.g., Richard H. Weisberg, The Quest for Silence.· Faulkner's Lawyer in a Comparative Setting, 4 MISS. C. L. REv. 193 (1984) (discussing scholarship about Benbow and Stevens).
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larly requires the skill of communication, that is to say, the lawyer's
immersion in the other at the moment of verbal exchange. One who,
like Horace Benbow in Sanctuary, consistently fails to reckon with the
rhetorical needs of his various audiences - clients, witnesses, court,
and jury - will be both a "loser'' and, more importantly, a malefactor; Gavin Stevens, on the other hand, listens, evokes, and weaves tales
that affect the audience. He wins, but beyond this he teaches, he delights, and he weaves meritorious chapters into the larger story of his
community.
Watson artfully imbeds strong readings of individual passages
from Faulkner within a tetralogical structure that, although not apparent from his chapter headings, 15 elevates the significance of forensics in Faulkner to a virtual cultural commentary. I will employ
Watson's four major themes as a structuring device to state what
looms largest within his book.
(a) Cincinnatus. The legendary Roman soldier-citizen, who successfully defended his city against an invading army and then returned
to private life, serves as an exhilarating model for the best in Faulkner's lawyer figures. For Watson, as for the sources on which he relies, 16 American tradition locates Cincinnatus among the ranks of
practicing lawyers. The first four-score-and-seven years of the Republic produced men, from presidents on down, who saw public service in
times of crisis as a natural concomitant to their often homey and
highly localized law practices. A striking number of these lawyers
hailed from the South, and no small percentage of them also wrote
stories.17
Although it is easy today to be cynical about Cincinnatus - and I
will shortly wonder aloud about other of Watson's unabashed kudos
to our beleaguered profession - I believe that the image evokes what
Faulkner, at least, thought of southern law at its best. Gavin Stevens,
like Cincinnatus, gains not only private satisfaction from public duty
but also public competence from private relationships. His is not a
model for late-twentieth-century American law generally, but perhaps
15. These are "The Failure of the Forensic Storyteller: Horace Benbow,'' "The Emergence
of the Lawyer-Citizen: Gavin Stevens,"" 'We're After Just a Murderer, Not a Lawyer': Gavin
Stevens in Intruder in the Dust," "Colloquial Detection; or, 'Discovering It by Accident' in
Knight's Gambit," "Maieutic Forensics; or, Requiem for a Nun and the Talking Cure," and
"Reappraising the Forensic Figure: Gavin Stevens and His Discontents in The Town and The
Mansion." This explicit structure is largely unhelpful; it fails to leave the reader with a clear
sense of Watson's conclusions about any central theme of his work. Even Gavin Stevens, the
book's perennial focus, remains undefined, moving about from ineffectual babbler in Intruder in
the Dust to sensitive forensic mentor in Knight's Gambit and Requiem for a Nun and then back to
sophomoric middle-aged Romeo in the late trilogy. In addition, Watson never fully explains his
use of the word maieutic.
16. See pp. 31-39 & nn.24-25 {discussing the role of Cincinnatus in American mythology).
17. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 290-97
{1984).
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it should be. Our media-driven society dichotomizes the public and
private worlds; lawyers, like most folks, now tend to think of their
public personae as disjoined from their personal lives, which are
nuclearized bastions against the difficulties of the workday or even to the extent they may be interesting in a Faulknerian sense - fodder
for their professional enemies if brought to the light of day. Discourse
in the public arena is carefully crafted and reveals little of the richness
of the individual speaker's life and mind. What an impoverishment
for culture generally - this elimination of the Cincinnatus, this destruction of the link between the interpersonal richness of the locality
and the occasional civic-minded project! For the legal profession specifically, the late-century disjunction may be fatal, costing the field
most of its colorful rhetoric and a good part of its vision and national
leadership. 18
Watson's focus on Cinc4tnatus assists us in fathoming Faulkner's
association of regional humaneness and activist leadership. Because
most of us know lawyers who periodically respond to the call of public
service, bringing to it sensitivities honed by private practice and interpersonal awareness, this piece of the storyteller still offers hope for
law.
(b) Mentor. More pronounced still in Gavin Stevens, but I think
less typical of contemporary lawyers, is the proclivity to pass wisdom
along to the next generation. Watson spends a considerable part of
two chapters - Chapters Three and Four - describing Faulkner's
favorite lawyer as mentor, emphasizing Stevens's widely discussed relationship with his nephew and lawyer-to-be, Chick Mallison (pp. 11028, 167-69). Gavin, a bachelor until very late in Faulkner's oeuvre,
simply cannot stop preaching to his sister's boy. Roundly criticized by
most critics in this regard 19 - especially when Chick's instincts serve
to exonerate the innocent black suspect in Intruder in the Dust while
his uncle's verbosity almost los~ the case2° - lawyer Stevens wins
Watson's admiration until the very end of Faulkner's storytelling,
when in The Town and The Mansion Gavin's fatuous relationship with
the young Linda Snopes reverses his more laudatory tutoring of Chick
and replaces advice with silliness.21
Still, Watson once again locates a striving in Faulkner's stories that
is usually associated with law and that sets up a need for self-replication that is both human and humane. Faulkner clearly alludes to Mr.
Jaggers, perhaps the greatest forensic figure in English-language fie18. See generally RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
(1992).
19. See, e.g., id. at 83.
20. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE Dusr, supra note 7.
21. Pp. 208-31 (discussing WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE MANSION (Vintage Books 1965)
(1959), and FAULKNER, THE TOWN, supra note 7).
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tion, 22 and one who takes the raw Pip of Great Expectations and transforms him, for better and worse, into a competent communicator and
a potential force in the world of ideas and action.
As I have pointed out elsewhere,23 successful forensic lawyers in
mainstream nineteenth- and twentieth-century stories are almost always bachelors. Gavin follows Mr. Jaggers down that path in which
total commitment to the law leaves a gap that mentoring hopes to fill.
Although the real legal world around Faulkner, like our world today,
contained many fewer of these bachelors - and many more women than his stories might indicate, the question of how legal values are
transmitted from one generation to the next remains acute. The modem legal world is increasingly devoted to an idea of professionalism
that risks diminution or total elimination of the teaching function of a
liberal craft such as law. Here, as with Cincinnatus, Faulkner's stories
helpfully address perennial issues that lie at the essence of a life in the
law.
(c) Champion of the Outsider. Unique among his colleagues in
traditional Westem stories, the American lawyer possesses an idealistic streak that involves considerable self-sacrifice to an unpopular but
worthy client or cause. Faulkner's regional lawyers, whose careers
span a period of unprecedented social change in the South, are no less
magnanimous. True enough, in Intruder in the Dust, Watson must
struggle hard to find a Gavin Stevens in whom what other critics describe as passive verbosity becomes "[s]torytelling [as] a form of moral
action that can raise as well as reflect the consciousness of its audience.
It can save lives" (p. 152). Although to prove his black client's innocence Gavin needs the impetus of his nephew, of the latter's friend
Aleck Sander, and of a feisty old lady - Miss Habersham, undoubtedly another Faulknerian reference to Great Expectations - Watson
scores some points for the lawyer by establishing that Chick Mallison
learned to strive for justice by listening to his uncle (pp. 117-21). This
connection of ethics to language is a dominant theme in Watson's
book, and I will discuss it below.24 As to the Gavin Stevens of Intruder in the Dust, however, it is enough for now to concede that Watson corrects the often vicious attacks of other critics by reminding us
that Gavin's defense of Lucas Beauchamp is both selfless and ultimately successful (p. 40).
Watson stands on far firmer ground later in his study when he
analyzes the Gavin Stevens of Knight's Gambit. There, in the story
Monk, Gavin partly redeems the reputation of Monk Odlethrop, a
classical fictional outsider wrongly imprisoned for one murder and
22. Mr. Jaggers is a central figure in CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS (Oxford
University Press 1987) (1860-1861).
23. See WEISBERG, supra note 18, at 55.
24. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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then completely vilified in connection with a second that he commits
while in prison.25 Like Camus's roughly contemporaneous portrait of
Meursault in L 'etranger, 26 a comparison that Watson should not have
ignored, Monk stands ostracized by the law less because of his criminal deeds than because of his inability to speak well. He is by no
means the first character in forensic fiction to pay too heavy a penalty
because the real malefactor speaks better than he does. 27 This dominant theme of forensic fiction is perhaps storytelling's greatest challenge to legal reasoning, because from Dostoevski and Melville on,
storytellers have recognized that even the most activist of lawyers will
have a problem with a client, defendant, or witness who stubbornly
refuses - or, indeed, simply cannot - speak or think in "lawtalk."
Watson's own admiration for the ordered and eloquent narrations
of the law shines through even as he strikingly describes Gavin Stevens's selfless quest to redeem a victim of the law's unjust demand for
communication skills. As Watson notes regarding Stevens's insistence
on the revelation of the true, manipulative guilt of Monk's prisonmate,
Bill Terrel: "Here the lawyer-citizen's obligation to protect individual
liberty, dignity, and expression (even Monk's homely form of it) overrides his allegiance to the formal institutions and representatives of
law" (p. 157).
Why the parenthetical? Literary critics revere lawtalk, because at
its ordered heights it looks like literature. But literary artists know
better. Fortunately, Gavin Stevens at his height looks beyond words
to find the truth.
(d) Ethical Rhetorician. Watson's last implicit structuring category is his most ambitious. He anguishes openly about the nature of
legal rhetoric. Part of Watson's work is - rightly - indebted to the
works of James Boyd White, whose notion of "constitutive rhetoric"
finds within what I would call "lawtalk" the opportunity to build and
rebuild communities through virtually every legal utterance. 28 I have
been far more skeptical of talk alone - which White usually divorces
from the preingrained value structure that always affects talk even
when it is hidden or "considerate." I am not sure that opening a legal
dialogue in a circumstance of clear coercion has any ethical dimension
beyond assuaging the more powerful party's need to look, sound, and
feel rational or evenhanded. The examples of Vichy France, or South
Africa, or of many contemporary American legal rhetorical moments
25. WILLIAM FAULKNER, Monk, in KNIGHT'S GAMBIT, supra note 7, at 40.
26. Faulkner published Monk in 1937, and Caxnus published L'etranger in 1942.
27. The obvious model, again not conjured by Watson, is in Great Expectations, in which the
inarticulate convict Magwitch is brought down by his clever and wordy conspirator, Compeyson.
See DICKENS, supra note 22, at 328-34, 412-24.
28. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 98 (1985).
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come to mind. 29 Yet White seems to privilege talk on its own and for
its own sake, virtually irrespective of the context: "'[T]he lawyer,'
James Boyd White emphasizes, 'must always start by speaking the language of his or her audience, whatever it may be.' " 30 What can "always" possibly mean here? Once a lawyer begins to speak a language
that he knows to be vicious, what has history shown us is likely to
occur? At best, we can expect changes at the extreme margins of law
and behavior - at worst, acceptance of that which need not have been
authoritatively confirmed to begin with. 31
So another part of Watson goes beyond White and insists upon
"the integrity of the community on whose behalf [the lawyer-citizen]
speaks and acts" (p. 36). The lawyer, on this view, cannot be supported merely because he brings a rational, ordering eloquence to an
argument; he must also seek and reflect what is best in the community
that he represents, and he must do so in their values, not only in the
values of the legal system that all too often produce words in the service of the bad. Watson strives valiantly to establish a Faulknerian
norm of ethical legal rhetoric that conforms to this latter, rigorous
sense of legal ethics.
. Watson applies his assertion that a lawyer "must treat the legal
code not as an end in itself but as a means to the greater ethical ends of
individual freedom and social stability" (p. 36) to Gavin Stevens, the
sole lawyer in Faulkner who even approximates this norm. Watson's
attempt here goes beyond his interesting, and I think largely successful, claim that Stevens deserves better from the literary critical community, although - given the weakness and even the odiousness of
some of Faulkner's other lawyers - it remains highly dependent upon
Stevens. Watson pegs most of his study's normative assertions about
legal language in Faulkner on the following statement: "[Gavin] is
introduced, it seems to me, precisely in order to establish, for the first
time in Faulkner, the credentials of the forensic figure as a skilled,
benevolent storyteller" (p. 79).
Watson regularly reinforces this positive view of lawtalk as his
work proceeds. Naturally, his glowing assessment peaks when discussing the two works in which lawtalk arguably best demonstrates
the three other qualities of lawyers that we have just discussed. Thus,
Watson associates the practice of law in Intruder in the Dust with, as
stated above, "[s]torytelling [as] a form of moral action that can raise
as well as reflect the consciousness of its audience" (p. 132). In addition, Watson summarizes Gavin's performance in Knight's Gambit including his redemption of Monk's reputation - in elegiac terms that
29. See, e.g., Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 21 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 285, 287-300 (1993).
30. P. 19 (quoting WHITE, supra note 28, at 33 (alteration in original)).
31. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 29, at 291-300 (discussing Vichy legal rhetoric).
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blissfully soar above the average American's bitter distaste for lawyers
and their language:
On this view law is less a reified code of conduct than the living action of
a community and its members, a cultural conversation that takes place
not in the courts alone but along folkways and speechways, the vital lines
of contact that at once constitute and perpetuate social life. [p. 148]

No one - except perhaps White - recognizes this "cultural conversation" as any longer a part of the practice of American law.
Anthony Kronman, for example, recently wrote of the loss of the
"lawyer-statesman," the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century figure so vital to the development of our Republic and of its civic language. 32 Watson's formulation, if engaged abstractly, would offer a
kind of romanticized ideal. In the final section of this review, I will
return to it as such. 33 Yet, in the context of his more specific enterprise, Watson conjures for his readers, not a jurisprudential norm, but
instead a central claim about Faulkner's vision of the law. I do not
think that his claim can be sustained.
First, as Watson admits, Stevens alone among Faulkner's lawyers
stands even a remote chance of linking the folkways and the speechways through the practice of law {pp. 40-41). Yet, by the end of his
own book, Watson pretty much gives up on Stevens. In a chapter
entitled "Reappraising the Forensic Figure," Watson finds Stevens
wanting in the very trilogy that brings him to center stage, first in The
Hamlet, but especially in The Town and The Mansion (pp. 41-42). In
his relationships with Eula Vamer and her daughter, Linda, Stevens
becomes the hopelessly sophom9ric romantic so pilloried by the critics
in earlier stories, those in which Watson salvages the Stevens who later
disappoints. In his dealings with the increasingly powerful interloper
Flem Snopes, whom Watson perceives as everything that Faulkner detested - greedy, rootlessly ambitious, manipulative, and above all, silent (pp. 208-16) - Stevens eventually yields and becomes speechless.
I see the Gavin-related developments in Faulkner's late novels very
32. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE Losr LAWYER 3 (1993). Kronman's "lawyer-statesman"
has elements of Cincinnatus, but the two norms are not identical. The lawyer-statesman does not
need the intensely private world of personal and local relationships that is basic' to Cincinnatus.
In Watson's apt way of rendering the distinction:
Faulkner explored the image of the lawyer-citizen [in figures like General Compson, Judge
Stevens, and Sam Galloway] with a characteristic blend of sympathy and irony. In the
figure of Gavin Stevens, however, he created his most detailed version of the lawyer as
Cincinnatus . • • a synecdoche for the entire private realm the good citizen willingly forsakes
in order to answer the call to duty.
P. 35. Perhaps as an outgrowth of this distinction, Kronman's analysis underemphasizes the
importance of reading, and of fiction more generally, to the well-rounded lawyer-statesman. Yet
the twinned activities of storytelling and story listening were central to American law in its
heyday, and these activities are of course also basic to the field of law and literature, which
Watson creatively engages but which Kronman - in emphasizing law and economics and critical legal studies - distances from his analysis.
33. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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differently, 34 but for present purposes there is no need to rehearse my
argument. I would only note that if Watson cannot find ethical power
in the Gavin of the trilogy, then his earlier endeavor to redeem the
lawyer seems quite futile. We are left with a verbose and often fatuous
lawyer, at worst a racist - as the "Gavin-bashers" characterize his
performance with Lucas in Intruder in the Dust 35 - and at best a
benign influence on younger people, who probably would have developed sensitive personalities even without Wm. Thus, the Chick Mallison who finds the inner moral drive to help Lucas - despite his
uncle's overt reluctance to believe the black man - cannot credibly be
associated at this crucial moment with Gavin's rhetoric. Moreover,
when Watson reminds us - correctly - of how much of Chick's understanding of the world came from conversations with Gavin, he fails
to note in the long list of quotations (pp. 118-19) their use of the pluperfect tense - for example, "his uncle had told him" 36 - and that
usage's clear implication that Chick's dependence on Gavin is a thing
of the distant past as the lad moves to his own sense of self, a sense
that is powerfully unbound from language.
Lawtalk. in Faulkner much too consistently brings about error, delay, and suffering. Watson admirably searches for an ethical legal
rhetoric, and he is as good as the best defense counsel might have been
in pushing our image of Gavin toward the good without - as I have
done - recognizing that Faulkner finally permits that beleaguered
character to break free from a dependence on language and to enter
the world of justice through experience and an unmediated engagement of the other. As we complete Watson's study, however, all that
remains of an admirable forensic in Faulkner is what we also derive
from Dostoevski, Melville, and Camus: the superb recognition
through the medium of the story of the trickiness of legal language, of
its capacity - even its proclivity - to harm, and of the absolute need
to teach lawyers about the risks, as well as the potential, embedded in
their professional discourse.
Perhaps because he knows this view of law is circulating although he also sees that law and literature strives for a harmonic
legal language and envisions attaining it - Watson pays his respects
to a variety of postmodern thinkers, and this homage deserves mention. With the directly relevant Camus largely absent from his discussion, Watson instead focuses on two other Frenchmen of our century,
Claude Levi-Strauss - for his notion of bricolage as analogous to the
lawyer's ability to make do with whatever falls into his hands and to
34. See WEISBERG, supra note 18, at 86-91.
35. For my own personal list of distinguished "Gavin-bashers,'' including Cleanth Brooks,
Irving Howe, and Steven Marcus, see Weisberg, supra note 14, at 194-96 & nn.3-20.
36. P. 118 (quoting FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE Dusr, supra note 7, at 42 (emphasis in
original)).
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tidy things up adeptly whatever the circumstances {pp. 21-25)- and
Roland Barthes - for his view of law as storytelling imposed on reality {pp. 19-21), a provocative view raised in several excellent essays
that Watson might well have contrasted with those of White. 37 Perhaps my skepticism about the insatiable urge of literary criticism (still)
to embellish even traditional exegesis with postwar French ornamentation made me unable to see the direct relevance of these thinkers, at
least in the context of Watson's enterprise.
Watson, however, in his use of Tsvetan Todorov {pp. 16-18) - a
superb structuralist whose readings of stories always merit considerable attention38 - hits a chord so close to his desires in this book that
one immediately understands the reference. Todorov traces the emergence of rhetoric out of the courts of law, where the "importance of
words exceeds that of the things they were supposed to represent." 39
Todorov has a way of naming a problem, and he does so here without
resolving it. But for Watson, it is as though Todorov established an
epistemological duality - between the thing represented and thing
representing - and then decided that the latter always replaces the
former.
Watson does not dwell on the implications of Todorov for his
study. This omission is surprising, for Todorov does not write about
Faulkner, and Watson must have cited him for some reason. Is
Watson conceding that legal rhetoric always seeks to master, but inevitably leaves in its wake, the reality about which it pretends to speak?
The rest of his book tries to pull away from that view. Indeed, Watson
makes perhaps his greatest contribution in suggesting, perhaps without proving, that postmodern storytellers do not stand arm in arm
with postmodern critics.

37. Two collections of Barthes's essays include ROLAND BARTHES, THE EIFFEL TOWER
AND OTHER MYTHOLOGIES (Richard Howard trans., 1st Am. ed. 1979), and ROLAND
BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (Annette Lavers trans., Hill & Wang 1972) (1957).
38. See, e.g., TSVETAN TODOROV, THE POETICS OF PROSE (Richard Howard trans., Cornell
Univ. Press 1977) (1971).
39. P. 17 (quoting TsVETAN TODOROV, An Introduction to Verisimilitude, in THE POETICS
OF PROSE, supra note 38, at 80, 80).

